REEVES v. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) 120 S.Ct. 2097
ROGER, REEVES, PETITIONER v. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-536.
Argued March 21, 2000
Decided June 12, 2000
Petitioner Reeves, 57, and Joe Oswalt, in his mid-thirties, were the
supervisors in one of respondent's departments known as the "Hinge
Room," which was managed by Russell Caldwell, 45. Reeves'
responsibilities included recording the attendance and hours worked by
employees under his supervision. In 1995, Caldwell informed Powe
Chesnut, the company's director of manufacturing, that Hinge Room
production was down because employees were often absent, coming in
late, and leaving early. Because the monthly attendance reports did
not indicate a problem, Chesnut ordered an audit, which, according to
his testimony, revealed numerous timekeeping errors and
misrepresentations by Caldwell, Reeves, and Oswalt. Chesnut and other
company officials recommended to the company president, Sandra
Sanderson, that Reeves and Caldwell be fired, and she complied. Reeves
filed this suit, contending that he had been terminated because of his
age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA). At trial, respondent contended Reeves had been fired due to
his failure to maintain accurate attendance records. Reeves attempted
to demonstrate that this explanation was pretext for age
discrimination, introducing evidence that he had accurately recorded
the attendance and hours of the employees he supervised, and that
Chesnut, whom Oswalt described as wielding "absolute power" within the
company, had demonstrated age-based animus in his dealings with him.
The District Court denied respondent's motions for judgment as a matter
of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, and the case went to
the jury, which returned a verdict for Reeves. The Fifth Circuit
reversed. Although recognizing that Reeves may well have offered
sufficient evidence for the jury to have found that respondent's
explanation was pretextual, the court explained that this did not mean
that Reeves had presented sufficient evidence to show that he had been
fired because of his age. In finding the evidence insufficient, the
court weighed the additional evidence of discrimination introduced by
Reeves against other circumstances surrounding his discharge, including
that Chesnut's age-based comments were not made in the direct context
of Reeves' termination; there was no allegation that the other
individuals who recommended his firing
Page 134
were motivated by age; two of those officials were over 50; all three
Hinge Room supervisors were accused of inaccurate recordkeeping; and
several of respondent's managers were over 50 when Reeves was fired.
Held:
1. A plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination (as defined in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, and subsequent
decisions), combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable
factfinder to reject the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation for
its decision, may be adequate to sustain a finding of liability for
intentional discrimination under the ADEA. In this case, Reeves
established a prima facie case and made a substantial showing that
respondent's legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation, i.e., his
shoddy recordkeeping, was false. He offered evidence showing that he
had properly maintained the attendance records in question and that
cast doubt on whether he was responsible for any failure to discipline
late and absent employees. In holding that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict, the Fifth Circuit ignored
this evidence, as well as the evidence supporting Reeves' prima facie
case, and instead confined its review of the evidence favoring Reeves
to that showing that Chesnut had directed derogatory, age-based
comments at Reeves, and that Chesnut had singled him out for harsher
treatment than younger employees. It is therefore apparent that the
court believed that only this additional evidence of discrimination was
relevant to whether the jury's verdict should stand. In so reasoning,
the court misconceived the evidentiary burden borne by plaintiffs who
attempt to prove intentional discrimination through indirect evidence.
In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, the Court
stated that, because the factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put
forward by the defendant, together with the elements of the prima facie
case, may suffice to show intentional discrimination, rejection of the
defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer
the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination. Proof that the
defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of
circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional
discrimination, and it can be quite persuasive. See id., at 517. In
appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from
the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to
cover up a discriminatory purpose. See, e.g., Wright v. West,
505 U.S. 277, 296. Moreover, once the employer's justification has
been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative
explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to
put forth the actual reason for its decision. Cf. Furnco Constr. Corp.
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577. Such a showing by the plaintiff will not
always be adequate to sustain a jury's liability finding. Certainly
there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a
prima facie case and
Page 135
introduced sufficient evidence to reject the employer's explanation, no
rational factfinder could conclude that discrimination had occurred.
This Court need not  and could not  resolve all such
circumstances here. In this case, it suffices to say that a
plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find
that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the
trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.
Pp. 5-14.
2. Respondent was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law
under the particular circumstances presented here. Pp. 14-19.
(a) Rule 50 requires a court to render judgment as a matter of law
when a party has been fully heard on an issue, and there is no
legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find
for that party on that issue. The standard for judgment as a matter
of law under Rule 50 mirrors the standard for summary judgment under
Rule 56. Thus, the court must review all of the evidence in the
record, cf., e.g., Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor
of the nonmoving party, but making no credibility determinations or
weighing any evidence, e.g., Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc.,
494 U.S. 545, 554-555. The latter functions, along with the drawing
of legitimate inferences from the facts, are for the jury, not the
court. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255. Thus,
although the court should review the record as a whole, it must
disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is
not required to believe. Pp. 14-16.
(b) In holding that the record contained insufficient evidence to
sustain the jury's verdict, the Fifth Circuit misapplied the standard
of review dictated by Rule 50. The court disregarded evidence
favorable to Reeves  the evidence supporting his prima facie
case and undermining respondent's nondiscriminatory explanation
 and failed to draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.
For instance, while acknowledging the potentially damning nature of
Chesnut's age-related comments, the court discounted them on the
ground that they were not made in the direct context of Reeves'
termination. And the court discredited Reeves' evidence that Chesnut
was the actual decisionmaker by giving weight to the fact that there
was no evidence suggesting the other decisionmakers were motivated by
age. Moreover, the other evidence on which the court relied â€â€Â
that Caldwell and Oswalt were also cited for poor recordkeeping, and
that respondent employed many managers over age 50  although
relevant, is certainly not dispositive. See Furnco, supra, at 580.
The ultimate question in every disparate treatment case is whether
the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination. Here, the
District Court informed the jury that Reeves was required to show by
a preponderance of the evidence that his age was a determining and
motivating factor in the decision to terminate
Page 136
him. It instructed the jury that, to show respondent's explanation
was pretextual, Reeves had to demonstrate that age discrimination,
not respondent's explanation, was the real reason for his discharge.
Given that Reeves established a prima facie case, introduced enough
evidence for the jury to reject respondent's explanation, and
produced additional evidence that Chesnut was motivated by age-based
animus and was principally responsible for Reeves' firing, there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that respondent had
intentionally discriminated. Pp. 151-154.
197 F.3d 688, reversed.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. GINSBURG,
J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 154.
Jim Waide argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were
David A. Chandler, Victor I. Fleitas, Eric Schnapper, and Alan B.
Morrison.
Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for the United States et al.
as amici curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Solicitor General
Waxman, Deputy Solicitor General Underwood, Matthew D. Roberts, C.
Gregory Stewart, and Philip B. Sklover.
Taylor B. Smith argued the cause for respondent. With him on the
brief was Berkley N. Huskison.[fn*]
[fn*] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the AARP by
Thomas W. Osborne, Laurie A. McCann, Sally Dunaway, and Melvin Radowitz;
for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey Robert White;
for the Hispanic National Bar Association by Seth J. Benezra, Luis
Perez, and Gilbert M. Roman; for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law et al. by Daniel F. Kolb, Norman Redlich, Barbara R. Arnwine,
Thomas J. Henderson, Richard T. Seymour, Teresa A. Ferrante, Elainie R.
Jones, Theodore M. Shaw, Norman J. Chachkin, Charles Stephen Ralston,
Dennis C. Hayes, Antonia Hernandez, Judith L. Lichtman, Donna R.
Lenhoff, Marcia D. Greenberger, Judith C. Appelbaum, Martha F. Davis,
Sara L. Mandelbaum, and Steven R. Shapiro; and for the National
Employment Lawyers Association by Paul W. Mollica and Paula A. Brantner.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Alabama
Retail Association by John J. Coleman III and Marcel L. Debruge; for the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Marshall B. Babson, Stanley
Strauss, Stephen A. Bokat, and Robin S. Conrad; for the Equal Employment
Advisory Council by Ann Elizabeth Reesman; for the Product Liability
Advisory Council, Inc., by Andrew L. Frey, Charles Rothfeld, and Stephen
M. Shapiro; for the Society for Human Resource Management by Peter J.
Petesch, Thomas J. Walsh, Jr., Timothy S. Bland, and John E. Duvall; and
for the Texas Association of Business and Chamber of Commerce by Dean J.
Schaner and Scott M. Nelson.
Page 137
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the kind and amount of evidence necessary to sustain
a jury's verdict that an employer unlawfully discriminated on the basis
of age. Specifically, we must resolve whether a defendant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law when the plaintiff's case consists
exclusively of a prima facie case of discrimination and sufficient
evidence for the trier of fact to disbelieve the defendant's legitimate,
nondiscriminatory explanation for its action. We must also decide
whether the employer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under
the particular circumstances presented here.
I
In October 1995, petitioner Roger Reeves was 57 years old and had spent
40 years in the employ of respondent, Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,
a manufacturer of toilet seats and covers. 197 F.3d 688, 690 (CA5
1999). Petitioner worked in a department known as the "Hinge Room,"
where he supervised the "regular line." Ibid. Joe Oswalt, in his
mid-thirties, supervised the Hinge Room's "special line," and Russell
Caldwell, the manager of the Hinge Room and age 45, supervised both
petitioner and Oswalt. Ibid. Petitioner's responsibilities included
recording the attendance and hours of those under his supervision, and
reviewing a weekly report that listed the hours worked by each employee.
3 Record 38-40.
In the summer of 1995, Caldwell informed Powe Chesnut, the director of
manufacturing and the husband of company president Sandra Sanderson, that
"production was down"
Page 138
in the Hinge Room because employees were often absent and were "coming in
late and leaving early." 4 id., at 203-204. Because the monthly
attendance reports did not indicate a problem, Chesnut ordered an audit
of the Hinge Room's timesheets for July, August, and September of that
year. 197 F.3d, at 690. According to Chesnut's testimony, that
investigation revealed "numerous timekeeping errors and
misrepresentations on the part of Caldwell, Reeves, and Oswalt." Ibid.
Following the audit, Chesnut, along with Dana Jester, vice president of
human resources, and Tom Whitaker, vice president of operations,
recommended to company president Sanderson that petitioner and Caldwell
be fired. Id., at 690-691. In October 1995, Sanderson followed the
recommendation and discharged both petitioner and Caldwell. Id., at
691.
In June 1996, petitioner filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi, contending that he had been
fired because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. At trial, respondent contended that it had
fired petitioner due to his failure to maintain accurate attendance
records, while petitioner attempted to demonstrate that respondent's
explanation was pretext for age discrimination. 197 F.3d, at 692-693.
Petitioner introduced evidence that he had accurately recorded the
attendance and hours of the employees under his supervision, and that
Chesnut, whom Oswalt described as wielding "absolute power" within the
company, 3 Record 80, had demonstrated age-based animus in his dealings
with petitioner. 197 F.3d, at 693.
During the trial, the District Court twice denied oral motions by
respondent for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and the case went to the jury. 3 Record 183; 4
id., at 354. The court instructed the jury that "[i]f the plaintiff
fails to prove age was a determinative or motivating factor in the
decision to
Page 139
terminate him, then your verdict shall be for the defendant." Tr. 7 (Jury
Charge) (Sept. 12, 1997). So charged, the jury returned a verdict in
favor of petitioner, awarding him $35,000 in compensatory damages, and
found that respondent's age discrimination had been "willfu[l]."
197 F.3d, at 691. The District Court accordingly entered judgment for
petitioner in the amount of $70,000, which included $35,000 in liquidated
damages based on the jury's finding of willfulness. Ibid. Respondent
then renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law and alternatively
moved for a new trial, while petitioner moved for front pay. 2 Record,
Doc. Nos. 36, 38. The District Court denied respondent's motions and
granted petitioner's, awarding him $28,490.80 in front pay for two years'
lost income. 2 id., Doc. Nos. 40, 41.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that
petitioner had not introduced sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's
finding of unlawful discrimination. 197 F.3d, at 694. After noting
respondent's proffered justification for petitioner's discharge, the
court acknowledged that petitioner "very well may" have offered
sufficient evidence for "a reasonable jury [to] have found that
[respondent's] explanation for its employment decision was pretextual."
Id., at 693. The court explained, however, that this was "not
dispositive" of the ultimate issue  namely, "whether Reeves
presented sufficient evidence that his age motivated [respondent's]
employment decision." Ibid. Addressing this question, the court weighed
petitioner's additional evidence of discrimination against other
circumstances surrounding his discharge. See id., at 693-694.
Specifically, the court noted that Chesnut's age-based comments "were not
made in the direct context of Reeves's termination"; there was no
allegation that the two other individuals who had recommended that
petitioner be fired (Jester and Whitaker) were motivated by age; two of
the decisionmakers involved in petitioner's discharge (Jester and
Sanderson) were over the age of 50; all three of the Hinge Room
Page 140
supervisors were accused of inaccurate recordkeeping; and several of
respondent's management positions were filled by persons over age 50 when
petitioner was fired. Ibid. On this basis, the court concluded that
petitioner had not introduced sufficient evidence for a rational jury to
conclude that he had been discharged because of his age. Id., at 694.
We granted certiorari, 528 U.S. 985 (1999), to resolve a conflict among
the Courts of Appeals as to whether a plaintiff's prima facie case of
discrimination (as defined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)), combined with sufficient evidence for a
reasonable factfinder to reject the employer's nondiscriminatory
explanation for its decision, is adequate to sustain a finding of
liability for intentional discrimination. Compare Kline v. TVA,
128 F.3d 337 (CA6 1997) (prima facie case combined with sufficient
evidence to disbelieve employer's explanation always creates jury issue
of whether employer intentionally discriminated); Combs v. Plantation
Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519 (CA11 1997) (same), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1045
(1998); Sheridan v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061 (CA3
1996) (same) (en banc), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1129 (1997); Gaworski v.
ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 17 F.3d 1104 (CA8) (same), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 946 (1994); Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120
(CA7 1994) (same); Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421 (CA9 1993)
(same), with Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156 F.3d 1284 (CADC 1998)
(en banc) (plaintiff's discrediting of employer's explanation is entitled
to considerable weight, such that plaintiff should not be routinely
required to submit evidence over and above proof of pretext), and with
Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332 (CA2 1997) (en banc) (plaintiff
must introduce sufficient evidence for jury to find both that employer's
reason was false and that real reason was discrimination), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 1075 (1998); Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989 (CA5
1996) (same); Theard v.
Page 141
Glaxo, Inc., 47 F.3d 676 (CA4 1995) (same); Woods v. Friction Materials,
Inc., 30 F.3d 255 (CA1 1994) (same).
II
Under the ADEA, it is "unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age."
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). When a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment,
"liability depends on whether the protected trait (under the ADEA, age)
actually motivated the employer's decision." Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). That is, the plaintiff's age must
have "actually played a role in [the employer's decisionmaking] process
and had a determinative influence on the outcome." Ibid. Recognizing
that "the question facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is both
sensitive and difficult," and that "[t]here will seldom be `eyewitness'
testimony as to the employer's mental processes," Postal Service Bd. of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983), the Courts of Appeals,
including the Fifth Circuit in this case, have employed some variant of
the framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas to analyze ADEA claims
that are based principally on circumstantial evidence. See, e.g.,
Stokes v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 206 F.3d 420, 429 (CA4 2000);
Galabya v. New York City Bd. of Ed., 202 F.3d 636, 639 (CA2 2000); Hall
v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 1074, 1077-1078 (CADC 1999); Beaird v.
Seagate Technology Inc., 145 F.3d 1159, 1165 (CA10), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 1054 (1998); Hindman v. Transkrit Corp., 145 F.3d 986, 990-991
(CA8 1998); Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1432
(CA11), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 962 (1998); Keller v. Orix Credit
Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (CA3 1997) (en banc); Kaniff v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 258, 263 (CA7 1997); Ritter v. Hughes
Aircraft Co., 58 F.3d 454, 456-457 (CA9 1995); Bodenheimer v. PPG
Industries, Inc., 5 F.3d 955,
Page 142
957 (CA5 1993); Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 823 (CA1
1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985 (1992); Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock
Corp., 670 F.2d 66, 69 (CA6 1982). This Court has not squarely addressed
whether the McDonnell Douglas framework, developed to assess claims
brought under § 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), also applies to ADEA
actions. Because the parties do not dispute the issue, we shall assume,
arguendo, that the McDonnell Douglas framework is fully applicable here.
Cf. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311
(1996).
McDonnell Douglas and subsequent decisions have "established an
allocation of the burden of production and an order for the presentation
of proof in . . . discriminatory-treatment cases." St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993). First, the plaintiff must
establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Ibid.; Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-253 (1981). It is
undisputed that petitioner satisfied this burden here: (i) at the time he
was fired, he was a member of the class protected by the ADEA
("individuals who are at least 40 years of age," 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)),
(ii) he was otherwise qualified for the position of Hinge Room
supervisor, (iii) he was discharged by respondent, and (iv) respondent
successively hired three persons in their thirties to fill petitioner's
position. See 197 F.3d, at 691-692. The burden therefore shifted to
respondent to "produc[e] evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or
someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason."
Burdine, supra, at 254. This burden is one of production, not
persuasion; it "can involve no credibility assessment." St. Mary's Honor
Center, supra, at 509. Respondent met this burden by offering admissible
evidence sufficient for the trier of fact to conclude that petitioner was
fired because of his failure to maintain accurate attendance records.
See 197 F.3d, at 692. Accordingly, "the McDonnell Douglas framework
 with its
Page 143
presumptions and burdens"  disappeared, St. Mary's Honor Center,
supra, at 510, and the sole remaining issue was "discrimination vel non,"
Aikens, supra, at 714.
Although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under
this framework, "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact
that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff
remains at all times with the plaintiff." Burdine, 450 U.S., at 253. And
in attempting to satisfy this burden, the plaintiff  once the
employer produces sufficient evidence to support a nondiscriminatory
explanation for its decision  must be afforded the "opportunity to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons
offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext
for discrimination." Ibid.; see also St. Mary's Honor Center, supra, at
507-508. That is, the plaintiff may attempt to establish that he was the
victim of intentional discrimination "by showing that the employer's
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Burdine, supra, at 256.
Moreover, although the presumption of discrimination "drops out of the
picture" once the defendant meets its burden of production, St. Mary's
Honor Center, supra, at 511, the trier of fact may still consider the
evidence establishing the plaintiff's prima facie case "and inferences
properly drawn therefrom . . . on the issue of whether the defendant's
explanation is pretextual," Burdine, supra, at 255, n. 10.
In this case, the evidence supporting respondent's explanation for
petitioner's discharge consisted primarily of testimony by Chesnut and
Sanderson and documentation of petitioner's alleged "shoddy record
keeping." 197 F.3d, at 692. Chesnut testified that a 1993 audit of
Hinge Room operations revealed "a very lax assembly line" where employees
were not adhering to general work rules. 4 Record 197-199. As a result
of that audit, petitioner was placed on 90 days' probation for
unsatisfactory performance. 197 F.3d, at 690. In 1995, Chesnut ordered
another investigation
Page 144
of the Hinge Room, which, according to his testimony, revealed that
petitioner was not correctly recording the absences and hours of
employees. 4 Record 204-205. Respondent introduced summaries of that
investigation documenting several attendance violations by 12 employees
under petitioner's supervision, and noting that each should have been
disciplined in some manner. See App. 21-24, 30-37; 4 Record 206-208.
Chesnut testified that this failure to discipline absent and late
employees is "extremely important when you are dealing with a union"
because uneven enforcement across departments would keep the company "in
grievance and arbitration cases, which are costly, all the time." 4 id.,
at 206. He and Sanderson also stated that petitioner's errors, by
failing to adjust for hours not worked, cost the company overpaid wages.
3 id., at 100, 142, 154; 4 id., at 191-192, 213. Sanderson testified
that she accepted the recommendation to discharge petitioner because he
had "intentionally falsif[ied] company pay records." 3 id., at 100.
Petitioner, however, made a substantial showing that respondent's
explanation was false. First, petitioner offered evidence that he had
properly maintained the attendance records. Most of the timekeeping errors
cited by respondent involved employees who were not marked late but who
were recorded as having arrived at the plant at 7 a.m. for the 7 a.m.
shift. 3 id., at 118-123; 4 id., at 240-247, 283-285, 291, 293-294.
Respondent contended that employees arriving at 7 a.m. could not have
been at their workstations by 7 a.m., and therefore must have been late.
3 id., at 119-120; 4 id., at 241, 245. But both petitioner and Oswalt
testified that the company's automated timeclock often failed to scan
employees' timecards, so that the timesheets would not record any time of
arrival. 3 id., at 6, 85; 4 id., at 334-335. On these occasions,
petitioner and Oswalt would visually check the workstations and record
whether the employees were present at the start of the shift. 3 id., at
6, 85-87;
Page 145
4 id., at 335. They stated that if an employee arrived promptly but the
timesheet contained no time of arrival, they would reconcile the two by
marking "7 a.m." as the employee's arrival time, even if the employee
actually arrived at the plant earlier. Ibid. On cross-examination,
Chesnut acknowledged that the timeclock sometimes malfunctioned, and that
if "people were there at their work station[s]" at the start of the
shift, the supervisor "would write in seven o'clock." 4 id., at 244.
Petitioner also testified that when employees arrived before or stayed
after their shifts, he would assign them additional work so they would
not be overpaid. See 197 F.3d, at 693.
Petitioner similarly cast doubt on whether he was responsible for any
failure to discipline late and absent employees. Petitioner testified
that his job only included reviewing the daily and weekly attendance
reports, and that disciplinary writeups were based on the monthly
reports, which were reviewed by Caldwell. 3 Record 20-22; 4 id., at 335.
Sanderson admitted that Caldwell, and not petitioner, was responsible for
citing employees for violations of the company's attendance policy. 3
id., at 20-21, 137-138. Further, Chesnut conceded that there had never
been a union grievance or employee complaint arising from petitioner's
recordkeeping, and that the company had never calculated the amount of
overpayments allegedly attributable to petitioner's errors. 4 id., at
267, 301. Petitioner also testified that, on the day he was fired,
Chesnut said that his discharge was due to his failure to report as
absent one employee, Gina Mae Coley, on two days in September 1995. 3
id., at 23, 70; 4 id., at 335-336. But petitioner explained that he had
spent those days in the hospital, and that Caldwell was therefore
responsible for any overpayment of Coley. 3 id., at 17, 22. Finally,
petitioner stated that on previous occasions that employees were paid for
hours they had not worked, the company had simply adjusted those
employees' next paychecks to correct the errors. 3 id., at 72-73.
Page 146
Based on this evidence, the Court of Appeals concluded that petitioner
"very well may be correct" that "a reasonable jury could have found that
[respondent's] explanation for its employment decision was pretextual."
197 F.3d, at 693. Nonetheless, the court held that this showing,
standing alone, was insufficient to sustain the jury's finding of
liability: "We must, as an essential final step, determine whether Reeves
presented sufficient evidence that his age motivated [respondent's]
employment decision." Ibid. And in making this determination, the Court
of Appeals ignored the evidence supporting petitioner's prima facie case
and challenging respondent's explanation for its decision. See id., at
693-694. The court confined its review of evidence favoring petitioner
to that evidence showing that Chesnut had directed derogatory, age-based
comments at petitioner, and that Chesnut had singled out petitioner for
harsher treatment than younger employees. See ibid. It is therefore
apparent that the court believed that only this additional evidence of
discrimination was relevant to whether the jury's verdict should stand.
That is, the Court of Appeals proceeded from the assumption that a prima
facie case of discrimination, combined with sufficient evidence for the
trier of fact to disbelieve the defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its decision, is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a
jury's finding of intentional discrimination.
In so reasoning, the Court of Appeals misconceived the evidentiary
burden borne by plaintiffs who attempt to prove intentional
discrimination through indirect evidence. This much is evident from our
decision in St. Mary's Honor Center. There we held that the factfinder's
rejection of the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
action does not compel judgment for the plaintiff. 509 U.S., at 511. The
ultimate question is whether the employer intentionally discriminated,
and proof that "the employer's proffered reason is unpersuasive, or even
obviously contrived, does not necessarily establish that the plaintiff's
proffered reason . . . is
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correct." Id., at 524. In other words, "[i]t is not enough . . . to
disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff's
explanation of intentional discrimination." Id., at 519.
In reaching this conclusion, however, we reasoned that it is
permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of
discrimination from the falsity of the employer's explanation.
Specifically, we stated:
"The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward
by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is
accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together
with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to
show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of
the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the
trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of
intentional discrimination." Id., at 511.
Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is
simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of
intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive. See id., at
517 ("[P]roving the employer's reason false becomes part of (and often
considerably assists) the greater enterprise of proving that the real
reason was intentional discrimination"). In appropriate circumstances,
the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the
explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory
purpose. Such an inference is consistent with the general principle of
evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party's
dishonesty about a material fact as "affirmative evidence of guilt."
Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992); see also Wilson v. United
States, 162 U.S. 613, 620-621 (1896); 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence §
278(2), p. 133 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1979). Moreover, once the employer's
justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most
likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer is in the
best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision. Cf. Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters,
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438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) ("[W]hen all legitimate reasons for rejecting an
applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's
actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who we generally assume
acts with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible
consideration"). Thus, a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with
sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is
false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer
unlawfully discriminated.
This is not to say that such a showing by the plaintiff will always be
adequate to sustain a jury's finding of liability. Certainly there will
be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie
case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant's
explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was
discriminatory. For instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment
as a matter of law if the record conclusively revealed some other,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision, or if the plaintiff
created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was
untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence
that no discrimination had occurred. See Aka v. Washington Hospital
Center, 156 F.3d, at 1291-1292; see also Fisher v. Vassar College,
114 F.3d, at 1338 ("[I]f the circumstances show that the defendant gave the
false explanation to conceal something other than discrimination, the
inference of discrimination will be weak or nonexistent"). To hold
otherwise would be effectively to insulate an entire category of
employment discrimination cases from review under Rule 50, and we have
reiterated that trial courts should not "`treat discrimination
differently from other ultimate questions of fact.'" St. Mary's Honor
Center, supra, at 524 (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S., at 716).
Whether judgment as a matter of law is appropriate in any particular
case will depend on a number of factors. Those include the strength of
the plaintiff's prima facie case, the
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probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and
any other evidence that supports the employer's case and that properly
may be considered on a motion for judgment as a matter of law. See
infra, at 15-16. For purposes of this case, we need not  and
could not  resolve all of the circumstances in which such factors
would entitle an employer to judgment as a matter of law. It suffices to
say that, because a prima facie case and sufficient evidence to reject
the employer's explanation may permit a finding of liability, the Court
of Appeals erred in proceeding from the premise that a plaintiff must
always introduce additional, independent evidence of discrimination.
III
A
The remaining question is whether, despite the Court of Appeals'
misconception of petitioner's evidentiary burden, respondent was
nonetheless entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Under Rule 50, a
court should render judgment as a matter of law when "a party has been
fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary
basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 50(a); see also Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440,
447-448 (2000). The Courts of Appeals have articulated differing
formulations as to what evidence a court is to consider in ruling on a
Rule 50 motion. See Venture Technology, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas
Distribution Corp., decided with Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of America,
459 U.S. 1007, 1009 (1982) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). Some decisions have stated that review is limited to that
evidence favorable to the nonmoving party, see, e.g., Aparicio v. Norfolk
& Western R. Co., 84 F.3d 803, 807 (CA6 1996); Simpson v. Skelly Oil
Co., 371 F.2d 563, 566 (CA8 1967), while most have held that review
extends to the entire record, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor
of the nonmovant, see, e.g., Tate v. Government Employees Ins. Co.,
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997 F.2d 1433, 1436 (CA11 1993); Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374
(CA5 1969) (en banc).
On closer examination, this conflict seems more semantic than real.
Those decisions holding that review under Rule 50 should be limited to
evidence favorable to the nonmovant appear to have their genesis in
Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 (1949). See 9A C. Wright & A. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2529, pp. 297-301 (2d ed. 1995)
(hereinafter Wright & Miller). In Wilkerson, we stated that "in passing
upon whether there is sufficient evidence to submit an issue to the jury
we need look only to the evidence and reasonable inferences which tend to
support the case of" the nonmoving party. 336 U.S., at 57. But
subsequent decisions have clarified that this passage was referring to
the evidence to which the trial court should give credence, not the
evidence that the court should review. In the analogous context of
summary judgment under Rule 56, we have stated that the court must review
the record "taken as a whole." Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). And the standard for granting
summary judgment "mirrors" the standard for judgment as a matter of law,
such that "the inquiry under each is the same." Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-251 (1986); see also Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). It therefore follows that, in
entertaining a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court should
review all of the evidence in the record.
In doing so, however, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence. Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc.,
494 U.S. 545, 554-555 (1990); Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, at 254;
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 696,
n. 6 (1962). "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence,
and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge." Liberty
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Lobby, supra, at 255. Thus, although the court should review the record
as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party
that the jury is not required to believe. See Wright & Miller 299. That
is, the court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant
as well as that "evidence supporting the moving party that is
uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence
comes from disinterested witnesses." Id., at 300.
B
Applying this standard here, it is apparent that respondent was not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In this case, in addition to
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination and creating a jury
issue as to the falsity of the employer's explanation, petitioner
introduced additional evidence that Chesnut was motivated by age-based
animus and was principally responsible for petitioner's firing.
Petitioner testified that Chesnut had told him that he "was so old [he]
must have come over on the Mayflower" and, on one occasion when
petitioner was having difficulty starting a machine, that he "was too damn
old to do [his] job." 3 Record 26. According to petitioner, Chesnut
would regularly "cuss at me and shake his finger in my face." 3 id., at
26-27. Oswalt, roughly 24 years younger than petitioner, corroborated
that there was an "obvious difference" in how Chesnut treated them. 3
id., at 82. He stated that, although he and Chesnut "had [their]
differences," "it was nothing compared to the way [Chesnut] treated
Roger." Ibid. Oswalt explained that Chesnut "tolerated quite a bit" from
him even though he "defied" Chesnut "quite often," but that Chesnut
treated petitioner "[i]n a manner, as you would . . . treat . . . a child
when . . . you're angry with [him]." 3 id., at 82-83. Petitioner also
demonstrated that, according to company records, he and Oswalt had nearly
identical rates of productivity in 1993. 3 id., at 163-167; 4 id., at
225-226. Yet respondent conducted an efficiency study
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of only the regular line, supervised by petitioner, and placed only
petitioner on probation. 3 id., at 166-167; 4 id., at 229. Chesnut
conducted that efficiency study and, after having testified to the
contrary on direct examination, acknowledged on cross-examination that he
had recommended that petitioner be placed on probation following the
study. 4 id., at 197-199, 237.
Further, petitioner introduced evidence that Chesnut was the actual
decisionmaker behind his firing. Chesnut was married to Sanderson, who
made the formal decision to discharge petitioner. 3 id., at 90, 152.
Although Sanderson testified that she fired petitioner because he had
"intentionally falsif[ied] company pay records," 3 id., at 100,
respondent only introduced evidence concerning the inaccuracy of the
records, not their falsification. A 1994 letter authored by Chesnut
indicated that he berated other company directors, who were supposedly
his coequals, about how to do their jobs. Pl. Exh. 7, 3 Record 108-112.
Moreover, Oswalt testified that all of respondent's employees feared
Chesnut, and that Chesnut had exercised "absolute power" within the
company for "[a]s long as [he] can remember." 3 id., at 80.
In holding that the record contained insufficient evidence to sustain
the jury's verdict, the Court of Appeals misapplied the standard of
review dictated by Rule 50. Again, the court disregarded critical
evidence favorable to petitioner  namely, the evidence supporting
petitioner's prima facie case and undermining respondent's
nondiscriminatory explanation. See 197 F.3d, at 693-694. The court also
failed to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of petitioner. For
instance, while acknowledging "the potentially damning nature" of
Chesnut's age-related comments, the court discounted them on the ground
that they "were not made in the direct context of Reeves's termination."
Id., at 693. And the court discredited petitioner's evidence that
Chesnut was the actual decisionmaker by giving weight to the fact that
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there was "no evidence to suggest that any of the other decision makers
were motivated by age." Id., at 694. Moreover, the other evidence on
which the court relied  that Caldwell and Oswalt were also cited
for poor recordkeeping, and that respondent employed many managers over
age 50  although relevant, is certainly not dispositive. See
Furnco, 438 U.S., at 580 (evidence that employer's work force was
racially balanced, while "not wholly irrelevant," was not "sufficient to
conclusively demonstrate that [the employer's] actions were not
discriminatorily motivated"). In concluding that these circumstances so
overwhelmed the evidence favoring petitioner that no rational trier of
fact could have found that petitioner was fired because of his age, the
Court of Appeals impermissibly substituted its judgment concerning the
weight of the evidence for the jury's.
The ultimate question in every employment discrimination case involving
a claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff was the victim of
intentional discrimination. Given the evidence in the record supporting
petitioner, we see no reason to subject the parties to an additional round
of litigation before the Court of Appeals rather than to resolve the
matter here. The District Court plainly informed the jury that
petitioner was required to show "by a preponderance of the evidence that
his age was a determining and motivating factor in the decision of
[respondent] to terminate him." Tr. 7 (Jury Charge) (Sept. 12, 1997).
The court instructed the jury that, to show that respondent's explanation
was a pretext for discrimination, petitioner had to demonstrate "1, that
the stated reasons were not the real reasons for [petitioner's]
discharge; and 2, that age discrimination was the real reason for
[petitioner's] discharge." Ibid. (emphasis added). Given that petitioner
established a prima facie case of discrimination, introduced enough
evidence for the jury to reject respondent's explanation, and produced
additional evidence of age-based animus, there was sufficient evidence
for the jury to find that respondent had intentionally
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discriminated. The District Court was therefore correct to submit the
case to the jury, and the Court of Appeals erred in overturning its
verdict.
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring.
The Court today holds that an employment discrimination plaintiff may
survive judgment as a matter of law by submitting two categories of
evidence: first, evidence establishing a "prima facie case," as that term
is used in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973);
and second, evidence from which a rational factfinder could conclude that
the employer's proffered explanation for its actions was false. Because
the Court of Appeals in this case plainly, and erroneously, required the
plaintiff to offer some evidence beyond those two categories, no broader
holding is necessary to support reversal.
I write separately to note that it may be incumbent on the Court, in an
appropriate case, to define more precisely the circumstances in which
plaintiffs will be required to submit evidence beyond these two categories
in order to survive a motion for judgment as a matter of law. I
anticipate that such circumstances will be uncommon. As the Court
notes, it is a principle of evidence law that the jury is entitled to
treat a party's dishonesty about a material fact as evidence of
culpability. Ante, at 12. Under this commonsense principle, evidence
suggesting that a defendant accused of illegal discrimination has chosen
to give a false explanation for its actions gives rise to a rational
inference that the defendant could be masking its actual, illegal
motivation. Ibid. Whether the defendant was in fact motivated by
discrimination is of course for the finder of fact to decide; that is the
lesson of St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). But the
inference remains  unless it is conclusively demonstrated,
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by evidence the district court is required to credit on a motion for
judgment as a matter of law, see ante, at 15-16, that discrimination
could not have been the defendant's true motivation. If such conclusive
demonstrations are (as I suspect) atypical, it follows that the ultimate
question of liability ordinarily should not be taken from the jury once
the plaintiff has introduced the two categories of evidence described
above. Because the Court's opinion leaves room for such further
elaboration in an appropriate case, I join it in full.
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