TOYOTA MOTOR MFG., KY., INC. v. WILLIAMS, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) 122 S.Ct. 681
TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING, KENTUCKY, INC., PETITIONER v. ELLA WILLIAMS
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-1089.
Argued November 7, 2001
Decided January 8, 2002
Claiming to be unable to perform her automobile assembly line job
because she was disabled by carpal tunnel syndrome and related
impairments, respondent sued petitioner, her former employer, for
failing to provide her with a reasonable accommodation as required by
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The District Court
granted petitioner summary judgment, holding that respondent's
impairment did not qualify as a "disability" under the ADA because it
had not "substantially limit[ed]" any "major life activit[y]," §
12102(2)(A), and that there was no evidence that respondent had had a
record of a substantially limiting impairment or that petitioner had
regarded her as having such an impairment. The Sixth Circuit reversed,
finding that the impairments substantially limited respondent in the
major life activity of performing manual tasks. In order to demonstrate
that she was so limited, said the court, respondent had to show that
her manual disability involved a "class" of manual activities affecting
the ability to perform tasks at work. Respondent satisfied this test,
according to the court, because her ailments prevented her from doing
the tasks associated with certain types of manual jobs that require the
gripping of tools and repetitive work with hands and arms extended at
or above shoulder levels for extended periods of time. In reaching this
conclusion, the court found that evidence that respondent could tend to
her personal hygiene and carry out personal or household chores did not
affect a determination that her impairments substantially limited her
ability to perform the range of manual tasks associated with an
assembly line job. The court granted respondent partial summary
judgment on the issue whether she was disabled under the ADA.
Held: The Sixth Circuit did not apply the proper standard in determining
that respondent was disabled under the ADA because it analyzed only a
limited class of manual tasks and failed to ask whether respondent's
impairments prevented or restricted her from performing tasks that are
of central importance to most people's daily lives. Pp. 193-203.
(a) The Court's consideration of what an individual must prove to
demonstrate a substantial limitation in the major life activity of
performing manual tasks is guided by the ADA's disability definition.
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"Substantially" in the phrase "substantially limits" suggests
"considerable" or "to a large degree," and thus clearly precludes
impairments that interfere in only a minor way with performing manual
tasks. Cf. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565.
Moreover, because "major" means important, "major life activities"
refers to those activities that are of central importance to daily
life. In order for performing manual tasks to fit into this category,
the tasks in question must be central to daily life. To be
substantially limited in the specific major life activity of performing
manual tasks, therefore, an individual must have an impairment that
prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities
that are of central importance to most people's daily lives. The
impairment's impact must also be permanent or long term. See
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii-iii).
It is insufficient for individuals attempting to prove disability
status under this test to merely submit evidence of a medical diagnosis
of an impairment. Instead, the ADA requires them to offer evidence that
the extent of the limitation caused by their impairment in terms of
their own experience is substantial. 527 U.S. at 567. That the ADA
defines "disability" "with respect to an individual," § 12102(2),
makes clear that Congress intended the existence of a disability to be
determined in such a case-by-case manner. See, e.g., Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483. An individualized assessment of the
effect of an impairment is particularly necessary when the impairment
is one such as carpal tunnel syndrome, in which symptoms vary widely
from person to person. Pp. 11-14.
(b) The Sixth Circuit erred in suggesting that, in order to prove a
substantial limitation in the major life activity of performing manual
tasks, a plaintiff must show that her manual disability involves a
"class" of manual activities, and that those activities affect the
ability to perform tasks at work. Nothing in the ADA's text, this
Court's opinions, or the regulations suggests that a class-based
framework should apply outside the context of the major life activity
of working. While the Sixth Circuit addressed the different major life
activity of performing manual tasks, its analysis erroneously
circumvented Sutton, supra, at 491, by focusing on respondent's
inability to perform manual tasks associated only with her job.
Rather, the central inquiry must be whether the claimant is unable to
perform the variety of tasks central to most people's daily lives. Also
without support is the Sixth Circuit's assertion that the question of
whether an impairment constitutes a disability is to be answered only
by analyzing the impairment's effect in the workplace. That the ADA
"disability" definition applies not only to the portion of the ADA
dealing with employment, but also to the other provisions dealing with
public transportation and public accommodations,
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demonstrates that the definition is intended to cover individuals
with disabling impairments regardless of whether they have any
connection to a workplace. Moreover, because the manual tasks unique
to any particular job are not necessarily important parts of most
people's lives, occupation-specific tasks may have only limited
relevance to the manual task inquiry. In this case, repetitive work
with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder levels for extended
periods, the manual task on which the Sixth Circuit relied, is not
an important part of most people's daily lives. Household chores,
bathing, and brushing one's teeth, in contrast, are among the types
of manual tasks of central importance to people's daily lives, so
the Sixth Circuit should not have disregarded respondent's ability
to do these activities. Pp. 199-203.
224 F.3d 840, reversed and remanded.
O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
John G. Roberts. Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on
the briefs were Jeffrey A. Savarise, John A. West, and Katherine A.
Hessenbruch.
Barbara B. McDowell argued the cause for the United States as amicus
curiae in support of petitioner. On the brief were Solicitor General
Olson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor
General Clement, Malcolm L. Stewart, Marleigh D. Dover, and Charles W.
Scarborough.
Robert Leslie Rosenbaum argued the cause and filed a brief for
respondent.[fn*]
[fn*] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American
Trucking Associations, Inc., et al. by Evan M. Tager and Miriam R.
Nemetz; for the Equal Employment Advisory Council et al. by Ann Elizabeth
Reesman, Katherine Y. K. Cheung, Jan S. Amundson, and Quentin Riegel; and
for Levi Strauss & Co. by John C. Burgin, Jr.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Jonathan
P. Hiatt, Michael H. Gottesman, and Laurence Gold; for the Association of
Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey Robert White; for the Judge David L.
Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law et al. by John Townsend Rich; for the
National Council on Disability by Arlene Mayerson and Nancy L. Perkins;
and for the National Employment Lawyers Association by Noah D. Lebowitz
and Paula A. Brantner.
Page 187
Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act),
104 Stat. 328, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V), a
physical impairment that "substantially limits one or more . . . major
life activities" is a "disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994
ed.). Respondent, claiming to be disabled because of her carpal tunnel
syndrome and other related impairments, sued petitioner, her former
employer, for failing to provide her with a reasonable accommodation as
required by the ADA. See § 12112(b)(5)(A). The District Court granted
summary judgment to petitioner, finding that respondent's impairments did
not substantially limit any of her major life activities. The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the impairments
substantially limited respondent in the major life activity of performing
manual tasks, and therefore granting partial summary judgment to
respondent on the issue of whether she was disabled under the ADA. We
conclude that the Court of Appeals did not apply the proper standard in
making this determination because it analyzed only a limited class of
manual tasks and failed to ask whether respondent's impairments prevented
or restricted her from performing tasks that are of central importance to
most people's daily lives.
I
Respondent began working at petitioner's automobile manufacturing plant
in Georgetown, Kentucky, in August 1990. She was soon placed on an engine
fabrication assembly line, where her duties included work with pneumatic
tools. Use of these tools eventually caused pain in respondent's hands,
wrists, and arms. She sought treatment at petitioner's in-house medical
service, where she was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome
and bilateral tendinitis. Respondent consulted a personal physician who
placed her on permanent work restrictions that precluded her from lifting
more than 20 pounds or from "frequently lifting or
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carrying . . . objects weighing up to 10 pounds," engaging in "constant
repetitive . . . flexion or extension of [her] wrists or elbows,"
performing "overhead work," or using "vibratory or pneumatic tools." Brief
for Respondent 2; App. 45-46.
In light of these restrictions, for the next two years petitioner
assigned respondent to various modified duty jobs. Nonetheless,
respondent missed some work for medical leave, and eventually filed a
claim under the Kentucky Workers' Compensation Act. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 342.0011 et seq. (1997 and Supp. 2000). The parties settled this
claim, and respondent returned to work. She was unsatisfied by
petitioner's efforts to accommodate her work restrictions, however, and
responded by bringing an action in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Kentucky alleging that petitioner had violated
the ADA by refusing to accommodate her disability. That suit was also
settled, and as part of the settlement, respondent returned to work in
December 1993.
Upon her return, petitioner placed respondent on a team in Quality
Control Inspection Operations (QCIO). QCIO is responsible for four
tasks: (1) "assembly paint"; (2) "paint second inspection"; (3) "shell
body audit"; and (4) "ED surface repair." App. 19. Respondent was
initially placed on a team that performed only the first two of these
tasks, and for a couple of years, she rotated on a weekly basis between
them. In assembly paint, respondent visually inspected painted cars
moving slowly down a conveyor. She scanned for scratches, dents, chips,
or any other flaws that may have occurred during the assembly or painting
process, at a rate of one car every 54 seconds. When respondent began
working in assembly paint, inspection team members were required to open
and shut the doors, trunk, and/or hood of each passing car. Sometime
during respondent's tenure, however, the position was modified to include
only visual inspection with few or no manual tasks. Paint second
inspection required team members to use their hands to wipe each
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painted car with a glove as it moved along a conveyor. Id., at
21-22. The parties agree that respondent was physically capable of
performing both of these jobs and that her performance was satisfactory.
During the fall of 1996, petitioner announced that it wanted QCIO
employees to be able to rotate through all four of the QCIO processes.
Respondent therefore received training for the shell body audit job, in
which team members apply a highlight oil to the hood, fender, doors, rear
quarter panel, and trunk of passing cars at a rate of approximately one
car per minute. The highlight oil has the viscosity of salad oil, and
employees spread it on cars with a sponge attached to a block of wood.
After they wipe each car with the oil, the employees visually inspect it
for flaws. Wiping the cars required respondent to hold her hands and arms
up around shoulder height for several hours at a time.
A short while after the shell body audit job was added to respondent's
rotations, she began to experience pain in her neck and shoulders.
Respondent again sought care at petitioner's in-house medical service,
where she was diagnosed with myotendinitis bilateral periscapular, an
inflammation of the muscles and tendons around both of her shoulder
blades; myotendinitis and myositis bilateral forearms with nerve
compression causing median nerve irritation; and thoracic outlet
compression, a condition that causes pain in the nerves that lead to the
upper extremities. Respondent requested that petitioner accommodate her
medical conditions by allowing her to return to doing only her original
two jobs in QCIO, which respondent claimed she could still perform
without difficulty.
The parties disagree about what happened next. According to
respondent, petitioner refused her request and forced her to continue
working in the shell body audit job, which caused her even greater
physical injury. According to petitioner, respondent simply began missing
work on a regular basis. Regardless, it is clear that on December 6,
1996, the
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last day respondent worked at petitioner's plant, she was placed under
a no-work-of-any-kind restriction by her treating physicians. On
January 27, 1997, respondent received a letter from petitioner that
terminated her employment, citing her poor attendance record.
Respondent filed a charge of disability discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). After receiving a right to sue
letter, respondent filed suit against petitioner in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. Her complaint
alleged that petitioner had violated the ADA and the Kentucky Civil
Rights Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.010 et seq. (1997 and Supp.
2000), by failing to reasonably accommodate her disability and by
terminating her employment. Respondent later amended her complaint to
also allege a violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(FMLA), 107 Stat. 6, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (1994 ed.
and Supp. V).
Respondent based her claim that she was "disabled" under the ADA on the
ground that her physical impairments substantially limited her in (1)
manual tasks; (2) housework; (3) gardening; (4) playing with her
children; (5) lifting; and (6) working, all of which, she argued,
constituted major life activities under the Act. Respondent also argued,
in the alternative, that she was disabled under the ADA because she had a
record of a substantially limiting impairment and because she was
regarded as having such an impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B-C)
(1994 ed.).
After petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and respondent
filed a motion for partial summary judgment on her disability claims, the
District Court granted summary judgment to petitioner. Civ. A. No. 97-135
(Jan. 26, 1999), App. to Pet. for Cert. A-23. The court found that
respondent had not been disabled, as defined by the ADA, at the time of
petitioner's alleged refusal to accommodate her, and that she had
therefore not been covered by the Act's protections or by the Kentucky
Civil Rights Act, which is construed
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consistently with the ADA. Id., at A-29, A-34 to A-47. The
District Court held that respondent had suffered from a physical
impairment, but that the impairment did not qualify as a disability
because it had not "substantially limit[ed]" any "major life activit[y],"
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). App. to Pet. for Cert. A-34 to A-42.
The court rejected respondent's arguments that gardening, doing
housework, and playing with children are major life activities. Id., at
A-35 to A-36. Although the court agreed that performing manual tasks,
lifting, and working are major life activities, it found the evidence
insufficient to demonstrate that respondent had been substantially
limited in lifting or working. Id., at A-36 to A-42. The court found
respondent's claim that she was substantially limited in performing
manual tasks to be "irretrievably contradicted by [respondent's]
continual insistence that she could perform the tasks in assembly [paint]
and paint [second] inspection without difficulty." Id., at A-36. The
court also found no evidence that respondent had had a record of a
substantially limiting impairment, id., at A-43, or that petitioner had
regarded her as having such an impairment, id., at A-46 to A-47.
The District Court also rejected respondent's claim that her
termination violated the ADA and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. The court
found that even if it assumed that respondent was disabled at the time of
her termination, she was not a "qualified individual with a disability,"
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994 ed.), because, at that time, her
physicians had restricted her from performing work of any kind, App. to
Pet. for Cert. A-47 to A-50. Finally, the court found that respondent's
FMLA claim failed, because she had not presented evidence that she had
suffered any damages available under the FMLA. Id., at A-50 to A-54.
Respondent appealed all but the gardening, housework, and
playing-with-children rulings. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed the District Court's ruling on whether respondent was disabled
at the time she sought an
Page 192
accommodation, but affirmed the District Court's rulings on respondent's
FMLA and wrongful termination claims. 224 F.3d 840 (2000). The
Court of Appeals held that in order for respondent to demonstrate that she
was disabled due to a substantial limitation in the ability to perform
manual tasks at the time of her accommodation request, she had to "show
that her manual disability involve[d] a `class' of manual activities
affecting the ability to perform tasks at work." Id., at 843.
Respondent satisfied this test, according to the Court of Appeals, because
her ailments "prevent[ed] her from doing the tasks associated with
certain types of manual assembly line jobs, manual product handling jobs
and manual building trade jobs (painting, plumbing, roofing, etc.) that
require the gripping of tools and repetitive work with hands and arms
extended at or above shoulder levels for extended periods of time."
Ibid. In reaching this conclusion, the court disregarded evidence
that respondent could "ten[d] to her personal hygiene [and] carr[y] out
personal or household chores," finding that such evidence "does not
affect a determination that her impairment substantially limit[ed] her
ability to perform the range of manual tasks associated with an assembly
line job," ibid. Because the Court of Appeals concluded that
respondent had been substantially limited in performing manual tasks and,
for that reason, was entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue
of whether she was disabled under the Act, it found that it did not
need to determine whether respondent had been substantially limited in
the major life activities of lifting or working, ibid., or whether
she had had a "record of" a disability or had been "regarded as"
disabled, id., at 844.
We granted certiorari, 532 U.S. 970 (2001), to consider the proper
standard for assessing whether an individual is substantially limited in
performing manual tasks. We now reverse the Court of Appeals' decision to
grant partial summary judgment to respondent on the issue of whether she
was substantially limited in performing manual tasks at the
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time she sought an accommodation. We express no opinion on the working,
lifting, or other arguments for disability status that were preserved
below but which were not ruled upon by the Court of Appeals.
II
The ADA requires covered entities, including private employers, to
provide "reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is
an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship."
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994 ed.); see also § 12111(2) ("The
term `covered entity' means an employer, employment agency, labor
organization, or joint labor-management committee"). The Act defines a
"qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds
or desires." § 12111(8). In turn, a "disability" is:
"(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual;
"(B) a record of such an impairment; or
"(C) being regarded as having such an impairment." § 12102(2).
There are two potential sources of guidance for interpreting the terms
of this definition  the regulations interpreting the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 361, as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988 ed.), and the EEOC regulations
interpreting the ADA. Congress drew the ADA's definition of disability
almost verbatim from the definition of "handicapped individual" in the
Rehabilitation Act, § 706(8)(B), and Congress' repetition of a
well-established term generally implies that Congress intended the term
to be construed
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in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations. Bragdon
v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998); FDIC v.
Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 437-438 (1986); ICC v. Parker,
326 U.S. 60, 65 (1945). As we explained in Bragdon v. Abbott, supra, at
631, Congress did more in the ADA than suggest this construction; it
adopted a specific statutory provision directing as follows:
"Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing
in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser
standard than the standards applied under title V of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 790 et
seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies
pursuant to such title." 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a)
(1994 ed.).
The persuasive authority of the EEOC regulations is less clear. As we
have previously noted, see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,
479 (1999), no agency has been given authority to issue regulations
interpreting the term "disability" in the ADA. Nonetheless, the EEOC has
done so. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)-(j) (2001). Because both parties
accept the EEOC regulations as reasonable, we assume without deciding
that they are, and we have no occasion to decide what level of
deference, if any, they are due. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
supra, at 480; Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 563, n. 10
(1999).
To qualify as disabled under subsection (A) of the ADA's definition of
disability, a claimant must initially prove that he or she has a physical
or mental impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). The Rehabilitation
Act regulations issued by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) in 1977, which appear without change in the current
regulations issued by the Department of Health and Human Services, define
"physical impairment," the type of impairment relevant to this case, to
mean "any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological;
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musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech
organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary;
hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)
(2001). The HEW regulations are of particular significance because at
the time they were issued, HEW was the agency responsible for
coordinating the implementation and enforcement of § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994 ed. and
Supp. V), which prohibits discrimination against individuals with
disabilities by recipients of federal financial assistance. Bragdon v.
Abbott, supra, at 632 (citing Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Darrone,
465 U.S. 624, 634 (1984)).
Merely having an impairment does not make one disabled for purposes of
the ADA. Claimants also need to demonstrate that the impairment limits a
major life activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994 ed.). The HEW
Rehabilitation Act regulations provide a list of examples of "major life
activities" that includes "walking, seeing, hearing," and, as relevant
here, "performing manual tasks." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2001).
To qualify as disabled, a claimant must further show that the
limitation on the major life activity is "substantia[l]."
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Unlike "physical impairment" and "major life
activities," the HEW regulations do not define the term "substantially
limits." See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and
Activities Receiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance,
42 Fed. Reg. 22676, 22685 (1977) (stating HEW's position that a definition of
"substantially limits" was not possible at that time). The EEOC, therefore,
has created its own definition for purposes of the ADA. According to the
EEOC regulations, "substantially limit[ed]" means "[u]nable to perform a
major life activity that the average person in the general population can
perform"; or "[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or
duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life
activity as compared to
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the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in
the general population can perform that same major life activity."
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2001). In determining whether an
individual is substantially limited in a major life activity, the
regulations instruct that the following factors should be considered:
"[t]he nature and severity of the impairment; [t]he duration or expected
duration of the impairment; and [t]he permanent or long-term impact, or
the expected permanent or long-term impact of or resulting from the
impairment." §§ 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii).
III
The question presented by this case is whether the Sixth Circuit
properly determined that respondent was disabled under subsection (A) of
the ADA's disability definition at the time that she sought an
accommodation from petitioner. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). The parties
do not dispute that respondent's medical conditions, which include carpal
tunnel syndrome, myotendinitis, and thoracic outlet compression, amount
to physical impairments. The relevant question, therefore, is whether the
Sixth Circuit correctly analyzed whether these impairments substantially
limited respondent in the major life activity of performing manual
tasks. Answering this requires us to address an issue about which the
EEOC regulations are silent: what a plaintiff must demonstrate to
establish a substantial limitation in the specific major life activity of
performing manual tasks.
Our consideration of this issue is guided first and foremost by the
words of the disability definition itself. "[S]ubstantially" in the
phrase "substantially limits" suggests "considerable" or "to a large
degree." See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1976)
(defining "substantially" as "in a substantial manner" and "substantial"
as "considerable in amount, value, or worth" and "being that specified to
a large degree or in the main"); see also 17 Oxford English Dictionary
66-67 (2d ed. 1989) ("substantial": "[r]elating to
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or proceeding from the essence of a thing; essential"; "[o]f ample or
considerable amount, quantity, or dimensions"). The word "substantial"
thus clearly precludes impairments that interfere in only a minor way
with the performance of manual tasks from qualifying as disabilities.
Cf. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S., at 565
(explaining that a "mere difference" does not amount to a "significant
restric[tion]" and therefore does not satisfy the EEOC's interpretation
of "substantially limits").
"Major" in the phrase "major life activities" means important. See
Webster's, supra, at 1363 (defining "major" as "greater in dignity,
rank, importance, or interest"). "Major life activities" thus refers to
those activities that are of central importance to daily life. In order
for performing manual tasks to fit into this category  a category
that includes such basic abilities as walking, seeing, and hearing
 the manual tasks in question must be central to daily life. If
each of the tasks included in the major life activity of performing
manual tasks does not independently qualify as a major life activity,
then together they must do so.
That these terms need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding
standard for qualifying as disabled is confirmed by the first section of
the ADA, which lays out the legislative findings and purposes that
motivate the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101. When it enacted the ADA in
1990, Congress found that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more
physical or mental disabilities." § 12101(a)(1). If Congress intended
everyone with a physical impairment that precluded the performance of
some isolated, unimportant, or particularly difficult manual task to
qualify as disabled, the number of disabled Americans would surely have
been much higher. Cf. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S., at 487
(finding that because more than 100 million people need corrective lenses
to see properly, "[h]ad Congress intended to include all persons with
corrected physical limitations among those covered by the Act, it
undoubtedly would have cited a much
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higher number [than 43 million] disabled persons in the findings").
We therefore hold that to be substantially limited in performing manual
tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely
restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central
importance to most people's daily lives. The impairment's impact must
also be permanent or long term. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii)
(2001).
It is insufficient for individuals attempting to prove disability
status under this test to merely submit evidence of a medical diagnosis
of an impairment. Instead, the ADA requires those "claiming the Act's
protection . . . to prove a disability by offering evidence that the
extent of the limitation [caused by their impairment] in terms of their
own experience . . . is substantial." Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,
supra, at 567 (holding that monocular vision is not invariably a
disability, but must be analyzed on an individual basis, taking into
account the individual's ability to compensate for the impairment). That
the Act defines "disability" "with respect to an individual,"
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2), makes clear that Congress intended the
existence of a disability to be determined in such a case-by-case
manner. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., supra, at 483;
Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, supra, at 566; cf. Bragdon v. Abbott,
524 U.S., at 641-642 (relying on unchallenged testimony that the
respondent's HIV infection controlled her decision not to have a child,
and declining to consider whether HIV infection is a per se disability
under the ADA); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j) (2001) ("The
determination of whether an individual has a disability is not
necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person
has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the
individual"); ibid. ("The determination of whether an individual is
substantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a
case-by-case basis").
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An individualized assessment of the effect of an impairment is
particularly necessary when the impairment is one whose symptoms vary
widely from person to person. Carpal tunnel syndrome, one of respondent's
impairments, is just such a condition. While cases of severe carpal
tunnel syndrome are characterized by muscle atrophy and extreme sensory
deficits, mild cases generally do not have either of these effects and
create only intermittent symptoms of numbness and tingling. Carniero,
Carpal Tunnel Syndrome: The Cause Dictates the Treatment, 66 Cleveland
Clinic J. Medicine 159, 161-162 (1999). Studies have further shown that,
even without surgical treatment, one quarter of carpal tunnel cases
resolve in one month, but that in 22 percent of cases, symptoms last for
eight years or longer. See DeStefano, Nordstrom, & Uierkant, Long-term
Symptom Outcomes of Carpal Tunnel Syndrome and its Treatment, 22A J. Hand
Surgery 200, 204-205 (1997). When pregnancy is the cause of carpal tunnel
syndrome, in contrast, the symptoms normally resolve within two weeks of
delivery. See Ouellette, Nerve Compression Syndromes of the Upper
Extremity in Women, 17 J. of Musculoskeletal Medicine 536 (2000).
Given these large potential differences in the severity and duration of
the effects of carpal tunnel syndrome, an individual's carpal tunnel
syndrome diagnosis, on its own, does not indicate whether the individual
has a disability within the meaning of the ADA.
IV
The Court of Appeals' analysis of respondent's claimed disability
suggested that in order to prove a substantial limitation in the major
life activity of performing manual tasks, a "plaintiff must show that her
manual disability involves a `class' of manual activities," and that
those activities "affec[t] the ability to perform tasks at work." See
224 F.3d, at 843. Both of these ideas lack support.
The Court of Appeals relied on our opinion in Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., for the idea that a "class" of manual
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activities must be implicated for an impairment to substantially limit
the major life activity of performing manual tasks. 224 F.3d, at 843.
But Sutton said only that "[w]hen the major life activity under
consideration is that of working, the statutory phrase
`substantially limits' requires . . . that plaintiffs allege they are
unable to work in a broad class of jobs." 527 U.S., at 491 (emphasis
added). Because of the conceptual difficulties inherent in the argument
that working could be a major life activity, we have been hesitant to
hold as much, and we need not decide this difficult question today.
In Sutton, we noted that even assuming that working is a major
life activity, a claimant would be required to show an inability to
work in a "broad range of jobs," rather than a specific job. Id., at
492. But Sutton did not suggest that a class-based analysis should be
applied to any major life activity other than working. Nor do the EEOC
regulations. In defining "substantially limits," the EEOC regulations
only mention the "class" concept in the context of the major life
activity of working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3) (2001) ("With respect
to the major life activity of working[,] [t]he term substantially limits
means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class
of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the
average person having comparable training, skills and abilities").
Nothing in the text of the Act, our previous opinions, or the regulations
suggests that a class-based framework should apply outside the context of
the major life activity of working.
While the Court of Appeals in this case addressed the different major
life activity of performing manual tasks, its analysis circumvented
Sutton by focusing on respondent's inability to perform manual tasks
associated only with her job. This was error. When addressing the major
life activity of performing manual tasks, the central inquiry must be
whether the
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claimant is unable to perform the variety of tasks central to most
people's daily lives, not whether the claimant is unable to perform
the tasks associated with her specific job. Otherwise, Sutton's
restriction on claims of disability based on a substantial limitation in
working will be rendered meaningless because an inability to perform a
specific job always can be recast as an inability to perform a "class" of
tasks associated with that specific job.
There is also no support in the Act, our previous opinions, or the
regulations for the Court of Appeals' idea that the question of whether
an impairment constitutes a disability is to be answered only by
analyzing the effect of the impairment in the workplace. Indeed, the fact
that the Act's definition of "disability" applies not only to Title I of
the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111-12117 (1994 ed.), which deals with
employment, but also to the other portions of the Act, which deal with
subjects such as public transportation, §§ 12141-12150,
42 U.S.C. § 12161-12165 (1994 ed. and Supp. V), and privately
provided public accommodations, §§ 12181-12189, demonstrates that the
definition is intended to cover individuals with disabling impairments
regardless of whether the individuals have any connection to a
workplace.
Even more critically, the manual tasks unique to any particular job are
not necessarily important parts of most people's lives. As a result,
occupation-specific tasks may have only limited relevance to the manual
task inquiry. In this case, "repetitive work with hands and arms extended
at or above shoulder levels for extended periods of time,"
224 F.3d, at 843, the manual task on which the Court of Appeals relied, is not an
important part of most people's daily lives. The court, therefore, should
not have considered respondent's inability to do such manual work in her
specialized assembly line job as sufficient proof that she was
substantially limited in performing manual tasks.
At the same time, the Court of Appeals appears to have disregarded the
very type of evidence that it should have focused upon. It treated as
irrelevant "[t]he fact that [respondent] can . . . ten[d] to her personal
hygiene [and] carr[y]
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out personal or household chores." Ibid. Yet household chores,
bathing, and brushing one's teeth are among the types of manual tasks
of central importance to people's daily lives, and should have been
part of the assessment of whether respondent was substantially limited
in performing manual tasks.
The District Court noted that at the time respondent sought an
accommodation from petitioner, she admitted that she was able to do the
manual tasks required by her original two jobs in QCIO. App. to Pet. for
Cert. A-36. In addition, according to respondent's deposition testimony,
even after her condition worsened, she could still brush her teeth, wash
her face, bathe, tend her flower garden, fix breakfast, do laundry, and
pick up around the house. App. 32-34. The record also indicates that her
medical conditions caused her to avoid sweeping, to quit dancing, to
occasionally seek help dressing, and to reduce how often she plays with
her children, gardens, and drives long distances. Id., at 32, 38-39. But
these changes in her life did not amount to such severe restrictions in
the activities that are of central importance to most people's daily
lives that they establish a manual-task disability as a matter of law. On
this record, it was therefore inappropriate for the Court of Appeals to
grant partial summary judgment to respondent on the issue whether she was
substantially limited in performing manual tasks, and its decision to do
so must be reversed.
In its brief on the merits, petitioner asks us to reinstate the
District Court's grant of summary judgment to petitioner on the manual
task issue. In its petition for certiorari, however, petitioner did not
seek summary judgment; it argued only that the Court of Appeals' reasons
for granting partial summary judgment to respondent were unsound. This
Court's Rule 14.1(a) provides: "Only the questions set out in the
petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court."
The question of whether petitioner was entitled to summary judgment on the
manual task issue is
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therefore not properly before us. See Irvine v. California,
347 U.S. 128, 129-130 (1954).
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment granting partial
summary judgment to respondent and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
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